Lessons that I have taken from my own experiences with the 1999 Doublehanded Farallones Race and from discussion with others regarding other tradgedies and near-misses

Jacklines and Tethers:

  • preferably run jacklines somewhat inboard (to keep overboard crew close to the boat)
  • terminate in the vicinity of the primaries (to keep overboard crew beside rather than behind the boat
  • double-ended tethers could save time and will enhance safety
  • the obvious #1: jacklines do not work if you do not install them
  • the obvious #2: jacklines do not work if you fail to use your tether
  • one suggestion: a cockpit sole pad-eye at the mid-traveller centerline
  • another suggestion: a cockpit pad-eye at the companionway on centerline

    • Crew Overboard Recovery

  • keep a block and tackle where you can get at it
  • pulling laterally (e.g., across the deck from a primary) to get somebody on deck does not work if you are lifting from the harness/chest, you have to pull up or all you will do is crack ribs. This means you need a fixed point above deck level -- either a halyard or a connection to the backstay (e.g., at the split of a split backstay)
  • if the overboard crew is functioning... a line fixed from a cleat, overboard under their foot, then up to a primary can work like an elevator... but the overboard crew has got to understand what you are doing. (discuss the procedure with everybody on the boat...)
  • my personal favorite: once you get your overboard crewmember to the boat.. tie them to it. You do not want them to get away. This follows the human factors design principle of designing for error recovery. If you make an error.. now you can recover :)
  • One you have your overboard crewmember to the boat... have the crew drop sails if you have not already done so.
  • Imagine this... take a full size laundry bag filled with table linen. Drop it over the side... hoist it back on board. you are not allowed to use anythinglike the drawstrings unless every member of your crew always wears a harness. In cold water (e.g., SF Bay), this is the second, never practiced, part of man overboard recovery that can be required if your first attempt at rescue runs into any sort of a snag.

    • VHF:

  • ocean racing... monitor channel 16
  • away from shore? weak transmission? no response? ask those who hear your transmission to leapfrog your message to the coast guard. Evidently some transmissions, particularly from handheld VHFs, did not reach the 30 miles to the coast guard reciever that day.
  • What happens if you have to cut your rig loose? emergency antennae are easy to build and will screw into the back of your VHF

    • Reducing Sail:

  • fortunately, everybody knew the race was going to be a windy one before the start, so no one was caught unaware by the building breeze
  • the J/29 is a crew-ballasted boat; without crew... it is has a very low stability coefficient...
  • nevertheless, the obvious #1 rule "reef when it first crosses your mind"
  • the ultimate reduction: where are your boltcutters and hacksaws?
  • Reinforce the (will-be-heavily loaded) reef clew attachment point with a redundant connection. Our "redundant" connection was a sail tie twice around the boom at each reef clew once we were using that reef point. The reef line broke at least twice. We broke an additional two or three sail ties.

    Point of Sail:

  • The broad reach is the most dangerous point of sail. Although obvious when flying spinnaker, also true in big waves under white sails because the beam is to the crest. Our broach was extreme enough that I feel lucky not to have been hit by the boom as it is likely it was carried back by the water on the face of the wave before the water in the crest presumably landed on the sail and forced the break (if it had not broken already due to wind pressure against the dragging main).
  • aiming down the face of a wave is good... except that in really heavy air a puff will put the boom to the spreaders and then overpower the rudder to turn the boat upwind (to take the crest broadside)... it was doing this even with the J/29's relatively good rudder traction (under most conditions) and the second reef in the main.

    • Sea State:

  • The wind was handle-able. The waves were closely packed, were from slightly mixed directions, and breaking. (ebb versus 30+ kts, by a shoal)
  • Much has been written about the fact that it is the waves, not the wind, that can turn an extreme day into an extreme tragedy. My experience is largely consistent with this.

    • Personal Identification:

  • Several cyclists are killed in Ontario every year. Often there is no identification on them or their bicycle. Can you imagine running an advertisement to find out who the cyclist was? For a long time it was totally unclear to the coast guard (and RC) which person was with the coast guard
  • carry "real" ID

    • Contact Numbers:
  • There was some confusion about which of Harvey or I were on the Coast Guard Boat (see above: and the PFD was stripped off and lost when Harvey was on the rescue craft). The phone contact numbers that were on file with the race committee were our 'home' numbers... which connect to cell phones that were either on the boat (and turned off)... or merely turned off. It turned out that it was up to me to track down Jorja after I had been brought to a semi-functioning post-shock state by a shower at the GGYC...

    Hull Shape / Short-Handed Sailing / ... the evils of sport:

  • A J/29 is a wide hull boat designed for crewed racing. With a crew, it is very fast (PHRF 117), but still forgiving. For short-handed sailing, it is a good sized boat, is quite nimble, is still forgiving, but requires the motto "reef early; reef often" (as does any light displacement boat). This is not to say that a 70s vintage leadmine would not have been more at home in the conditions on the racecourse that day. Nevertheless, to paraphrase the standard sailing instruction "the decision to race is made by the participants, not the race committee." We felt comfortable with it. Up until the last wave, we had the cat by the tail.

    Humanity:
  • The sailing community is a good one. Throughout the whole sequence, and to this day, people have rallied themselves to do what they could and to do that which needed to be done. Of particular note: the excellent organizational skills and training evident in the RC management of BAMA
  • the (apparently standard-for-them) post-race preparations of the GGYC with post-shower clothes, etc.
  • the two double-handers (who normally crew on Zamazan) who cleaned up white lightning and put her to bed that night despite having raced their own race and having just put away their own boat.
  • others who did innumerable big and small things
  • the professionalism of the Coast Guard (both Local and National)
  • in fact, there is only one person (a longtime B-fleet sailor) who has evidenced any negativity towards the decisions that Harvey and I made that day. Although I do not really know him, and have never had a discussion with him re:the details, he has evidently decided on his version of events. Sadly, his actions are consistent with his less than stellar reputation in the sailing community. I just wish I did not have to be part of his story-book of knowledge that he uses to impress people with when he meets them and needs to shore up his "authority" vis-a-vis sailing. It is a kind of memorial I could do without.
  • Jorja has done an admirable job of public speaking working towards more effective safety practices for racing sailboats (including speaking at US Sailing's Safety at Sea seminars).
    • 1999 Doublehanded Farallones